Social welfare function for restricted reference domain by Ohbo K. et al.
Social welfare function for restricted
reference domain
著者 Ohbo K., Tsurutani M., Umezawa M., Yamamoto Y
発行年 2004
著作の一部 Institute of Policy and Planning Sciences
discussion paper series ~ no. 1083
URL http://hdl.handle.net/2241/672
SOCIAL WELFARE FUNCTION
FOR RESTRICTED PREFERENCE DOMAIN
K. OHBO, M. TSURUTANI, M. UMEZAWA AND Y. YAMAMOTO
Abstract. We consider the social preference ordering in a society where each
individual’s preference domain is restricted to a subset of the whole set of alter-
natives. We show that the social welfare function satisfying unrestricted domain
property, independence of irrelevant alternatives and weak Pareto optimality is
always dictatorial when at least one individual is entitled to express his/her pref-
erence on the whole set of alternatives.
1. Introduction
We often encounter the problem of aggregating opinions of individuals in a society.
Arrow [2] introduced the social choice theory for this problem, and gave the monu-
mental impossibility theorem: a social welfare function which satisfies unrestricted
domain property, independence of irrelevant alternatives and Pareto optimality is
dictatorial. From then onward, the difficulty of the problem has been well recog-
nized, and a variety of impossibility theorems in the Arrow’s framework have been
developed. The reader is recommended referring to Sen [14].
This paper studies the existence and properties of a social preference ordering
when individual’s preference domain is restricted: one expresses one’s preference on
one’s alternative set that is a subset of the whole set of alternatives. This modi-
fication can be viewed as a relaxation of the unrestricted domain property in the
Arrow’s framework. For relaxation of the unrestricted domain property, there are
many researches such as Blair and Muller [3], Bordes and Le Breton [4], Fishburn
and Kelly [5], Kalai, Muller and Satterthwaite [8] and Redekop [10]. In particular,
Kalai and Muller [7], Ritz [11] and Ritz [12] deal with a restriction on permissible
preferences for individuals instead of profile restrictions.
Ando, Ohara, and Yamamoto [1] deals with the problem in a society where individ-
uals evaluate mutually. The set of alternatives coincides with the set of individuals,
and each individual expresses one’s preference ordering on the whole set of individu-
als except oneself. They studied properties of the social welfare function, and proved
that an outcome of social welfare function satisfying unrestricted domain property,
independence of irrelevant alternatives and Pareto optimality can be cyclic, hence
cannot be a weak order, meaning the nonexistence of social preference ordering.
In order to avoid the paradoxical outcome of Ando, Ohara, and Yamamoto [1], we
add several individuals who express their preference on the whole set of alternatives.
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Unlike their model, the set of alternatives can be any finite set instead of the set of
individuals. Accordingly, unrestricted domain property, independence of irrelevant
alternatives and weak Pareto optimality are defined. We will show in Theorem 3.1
that the social welfare function satisfying these three axioms is dictatorial. More
precisely, someone who expresses his/her preference on the whole set of alternatives
is a dictator.
This model is, for example, applied to a vote in a class. Take a vote for a relay team
(or a leader or a sub leader). Each pupil submits his/her preference on all of his/her
classmates except him/herself. The teacher, however, is entitled to expresses his/her
preference on all pupils in the class. The main theorem implies that the teacher is
a dictator under three axioms.
In Section 2, the framework of the model and notations are introduced. In Section
3, we give the main theorem. In Section 4, a special case will be discussed. Section
5 summarizes the results.
2. Notations and Framework
Let us denote the set of alternatives by X and assume that there are at least three
alternatives, i.e., |X| ≥ 3. A binary relation % on X is called a weak ordering if it
satisfies the following conditions:
(i) reflexivity : for any x ∈ X, x % x,
(ii) completeness : for any pair of alternatives x and y, either x % y or y % x holds,
(iii) transitivity : if x % y and y % z, then x % z.
We write x ∼ y when both x % y and y % x hold while we write x Â y when x % y
and y 6% x.
Let N = {1, ..., n} be the set of all individuals and assume that n ≥ 2. In Arrow’s
framework, each individual is interested in all of the alternatives, and hence his/her
preference is defined as a weak ordering on the whole set X. However, there might
be some individuals who are not interested in all the alternatives. To express such a
situation we consider the set of alternatives that are of interest to individual i, and
denote it by Xi. Then individual i has his/her preference being a weak ordering
on Xi. We denote by Wi the set of all weak orderings defined on Xi. Let P be a
subset of W1 × · · · ×Wn. We call an element p ∈ P a profile, and denote by %pi
the preference of individual i at profile p. A social welfare function, which will be
denoted by f hereafter, is a mapping that assigns a weak ordering on X to a profile
p ∈ P , i.e., f : P → W , where W is the set of all weak orderings on X, and we
denote by %p the weak ordering determined by f at profile p.
Some axioms on the social welfare function are introduced. The first axiom means
that each individual is allowed to have any preference one wishes.
Axiom 2.1 (Unrestricted Domain Property (UDP)). The domain P of the social
welfare function f is P =W1 × · · · ×Wn.
Given a set A ⊆ X of alternatives, let N(A) be the set of all individuals whose
preference domain contains A, i.e.,
N(A) = { i ∈ N | A ⊆ Xi }.
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Axiom 2.2 (Weak Pareto Optimality (WPO)). If
x Âpi y for all i ∈ N({x, y}) implies x Âp y,
holds for any alternatives x, y ∈ X and for any profile p ∈ P , then the social welfare
function f is said to have weak Pareto optimality.
Axiom 2.3 (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)). If
%pi |{x, y} =%qi |{x, y} for all i ∈ N({x, y}) implies %p |{x, y} =%q |{x, y}
holds for any alternatives x, y ∈ X and for any profiles p, q ∈ P , then the social
welfare function f is said to satisfy independence of irrelevant alternatives.
Definition 2.4 (Dictator). An individual i ∈ N is called a dictator if x Âpi y implies
x Âp y for any alternatives x, y ∈ Xi and for any profile p ∈ P . If there exists a
dictator, then the social welfare function f is said to be dictatorial.
3. Impossibility Theorem
We will show in this section that the social welfare function satisfying Axioms
(UDP), (WPO) and (IIA) is dictatorial in the presence of an individual of N(X).
The main theorem is as follows.
Theorem 3.1. Suppose that N(X) 6= φ. If a social welfare function f satisfies
Axioms (UDP), (WPO) and (IIA), then an individual in N(X) is a dictator.
We first define (x Â y)-decisive coalition and decisive coalition for the proof of
Theorem 3.1.
Definition 3.2 ((x Â y)-decisive coalition). Let x, y ∈ X be a pair of distinct
alternatives. A nonempty subset of individuals M ⊆ N({x, y}) is said to be an
(x Â y)-decisive coalition if for any profile p ∈ P
x Âpi y for all i ∈M and y Âpj x for all j ∈ N({x, y})\M imply x Âp y.
Definition 3.3 (decisive coalition). A nonempty subset of individuals M ⊆ N is
said to be a decisive coalition if M is an (x Â y)-decisive coalition for some pair of
distinctive alternatives x, y ∈ X.
To prove Theorem 3.1 we utilize these definitions and the following lemmas.
Lemma 3.4. Assume Axiom (IIA) and let M ⊆ N be a nonempty subset of
N({x, y}) for some distinct pair of alternatives x and y. If there is a profile p ∈ P
such that
x Âpi y for all i ∈M, y Âpj x for all j ∈ N({x, y})\M and x Âp y.
then M is an (x Â y)-decisive coalition.
Proof. Let q be an arbitrary profile such that x Âqi y for i ∈ M and y Âqj x for
j ∈ N({x, y})\M . Then %pi |{x, y} =%qi |{x, y} for all i ∈ N({x, y}). Applying
Axiom (IIA), we have x Âq y, meaning that M is an (x Â y)-decisive coalition. ¤
Lemma 3.5. Suppose that N(X) 6= φ and Axioms (UDP), (WPO) and (IIA). Then
any (x Â y)-decisive coalition contains an individual i with Xi\{x, y} 6= φ.
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Proof. Let M be an (x Â y)-decisive coalition and assume that Xi = {x, y} for all
i ∈M . Choose an arbitrary alternative, say z, of X\{x, y}. ThenM intersects none
of N({x, y, z}), N({y, z}) and N({x, z}), each of which contains N(X) and hence is
nonempty. Let p ∈ P be a profile such that
x Âpi y for i ∈M
y Âpi z Âpi x for i ∈ N({x, y, z})
y Âpi z for i ∈ N({y, z})\N({x, y, z})
z Âpi x for i ∈ N({x, z})\N({x, y, z})
y Âpi x for i ∈ N({x, y})\(M ∪N({x, y, z})).
Since M is an (x Â y)-decisive coalition, we have
(3.1) x Âp y.
Concerning the pair of y and z, y Âpi z holds for all i ∈ N({y, z}), implying
(3.2) y Âp z
by Axiom (WPO). In the same way we see
(3.3) z Âp x.
Clearly (3.2) and (3.3) together contradict (3.1). ¤
Lemma 3.6. Suppose that N(X) 6= φ and Axioms (UDP), (WPO) and (IIA). Then
there is a decisive coalition consisting of a single individual.
Proof. For a pair of distinct alternatives x and y, N({x, y}) is clearly an (x Â
y)-decisive coalition from Axiom (WPO). Therefore there is at least one decisive
coalition.
Let M be a decisive coalition that is minimal with respect to set inclusion par-
tial order, and suppose it is an (x Â y)-decisive coalition. We will show that the
assumption |M | ≥ 2 leads to a contradiction. We have seen in Lemma 3.5 that
Xi\{x, y} 6= φ for some individual i ∈ M . Let z be an arbitrary alternatives of
Xi\{x, y}. For i ∈M , z ∈ Xi\{x, y} and M \ {i} 6= ∅ thus constructed, we consider
a profile p ∈ P such that
z Âpi x Âpi y
x Âpj y Âpj z for j ∈ (M \ {i}) ∩N({x, y, z})
x Âpj y for j ∈ (M \ {i})\N({x, y, z})
y Âpj z Âpj x for j ∈ (N\M) ∩N({x, y, z})
y Âpj x for j ∈ (N\M) ∩ (N({x, y})\N({x, y, z}))
y Âpj z for j ∈ (N\M) ∩ (N({y, z})\N({x, y, z}))
z Âpj x for j ∈ (N\M) ∩ (N({x, z})\N({x, y, z})).
Since M is an (x Â y)-decisive coalition, we have
(3.4) x Âp y.
The following two cases are possible.
Case A: z Âp y.
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Since z Âpi y and y Âpj z for all j ∈ N({y, z})\{i}, we conclude that {i} alone
is a (z Â y)-decisive coalition from Lemma 3.4. This contradicts the minimality
assumption of M .
Case B: y %p z.
First note that
(3.5) x Âp z
by (3.4) and the transitivity. We will show that (M \ {i}) ∩ N({x, y, z}) is an
(x Â z)-decisive coalition. Suppose (M \ {i}) ∩ N({x, y, z}) = φ. Then z Âpi x for
all i ∈ N({x, z}). This implies z Âp x by Axiom (WPO), which contradicts (3.5).
Therefore (M \ {i}) ∩ N({x, y, z}) 6= φ. By the construction of p and (3.5) we see
that (M \ {i}) ∩ N({x, y, z}) is an (x Â z)-decisive coalition and this fact again
contradicts the minimality of M . ¤
Lemma 3.7. Suppose that N(X) 6= φ and Axioms (UDP), (WPO) and (IIA). Then
there is an individual of N(X) who alone forms a decisive coalition.
Proof. Let {i} be a decisive coalition demonstrated in Lemma 3.6, and assume that
it is an (x Â y)-decisive coalition. Note that x, y ∈ Xi. Suppose i 6∈ N(X), i.e.,
X\Xi 6= φ, and let z be an arbitrary alternative of X\Xi. Note also that z is distinct
from x and y. Now consider a profile p ∈ P such that
x Âpi y
y Âpj z Âpj x for j ∈ N({x, y, z})
y Âpj x for j ∈ N({x, y})\({i} ∪N({x, y, z}))
y Âpj z for j ∈ N({y, z})\N({x, y, z})
z Âpj x for j ∈ N({x, z})\N({x, y, z}).
Since {i} is an (x Â y)-decisive coalition, we have
(3.6) x Âp y.
We also have y Âp z and z Âp x by Axiom (WPO). This is contrary to (3.6).
Therefore we conclude that i ∈ N(X). ¤
Lemma 3.8. Suppose that N(X) 6= φ and Axioms (UDP), (WPO) and (IIA). If
an individual of N(X) is a decisive coalition, it is an (x Â y)-decisive coalition for
any pair of distinct alternatives x and y ∈ X.
Proof. Suppose that i ∈ N(X) forms an (x Â y)-decisive coalition, and let z be an
arbitrary alternative different from x and y. We first show that {i} is an (x Â z)-
decisive coalition and then show that it is a (z Â y)-decisive coalition.
(I) {i} is an (x Â z)-decisive coalition:
First consider a profile p ∈ P such that
x Âpi y Âpi z
y Âpj z Âpj x for j ∈ N({x, y, z})\{i}
y Âpj x for j ∈ N({x, y})\N({x, y, z})
y Âpj z for j ∈ N({y, z})\N({x, y, z})
z Âpj x for j ∈ N({x, z})\N({x, y, z}).
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Since {i} is an (x Â y)-decisive coalition, we see
(3.7) x Âp y.
Note that y Âp z since y Âpj z for all j ∈ N({y, z}). This together with (3.7) implies
x Âp z. Since x Âpi z and z Âpj x for all j ∈ N({x, z})\{i}, we conclude that {i} is
an (x Â z)-decisive coalition.
(II) {i} is a (z Â y)-decisive coalition:
Next, consider a profile q ∈ P such that

z Âqi x Âqi y
y Âqj z Âqj x for j ∈ N({x, y, z})\{i}
y Âqj x for j ∈ N({x, y})\N({x, y, z})
y Âqj z for j ∈ N({y, z})\N({x, y, z})
z Âqj x for j ∈ N({x, z})\N({x, y, z}).
Since {i} is an (x Â y)-decisive coalition, we have x Âq y. Furthermore, from
Axiom (WPO), we also have z Âq x, and hence by the transitivity, we have z Âp y.
Observe that z Âqi y and y Âpj z for all j ∈ N({y, z})\{i}. This means that {i} is
(z Â y)-decisive coalition.
Now let v and w be two distinct alternatives. When w 6= x, {i} is also an (x Â w)-
decisive coalition by the argument (I). Applying argument (II) we have that {i} is
a (v Â w)-decisive coalition. When w = x, choose an arbitrary z ∈ X\{x, y}. Then
by argument (II), {i} is a (z Â y)-decisive coalition. Applying argument (II) and
(I) repeatedly, we see that {i} is a (z Â w)-decisive coalition and then finally it is a
(v Â w)-decisive coalition. ¤
Proof of Theorem 3.1
Proof. We showed that there is an individual of N(X) who alone forms a decisive
coalition in Lemma 3.7. Let {i} be a singleton decisive coalition for i ∈ N(X). Take
an arbitrary pair of distinct alternatives x and y, and a profile p ∈ P such that
x Âpi y. We will show that x Âp y. Let
N1 = { j ∈ N({x, y})\{i} | x Âpj y },
N2 = { j ∈ N({x, y})\{i} | y Âpj x },
N3 = { j ∈ N({x, y})\{i} | x ∼pj y }, and
N4 = N\N({x, y}).
Choose an alternative z ∈ X\{x, y} arbitrarily, and consider the following profile
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q ∈ P such that 
x Âqi z Âqi y
z Âqj x Âqj y for j ∈ N1 ∩ (N({x, y, z})\{i})
x Âqj y for j ∈ N1\N({x, y, z})
z Âqj y Âqj x for j ∈ N2 ∩N({x, y, z})
y Âqj x for j ∈ N2\N({x, y, z})
z Âqj x ∼qj y for j ∈ N3 ∩N({x, y, z})
x Âqj y for j ∈ N3\N({x, y, z})
z Âqj y for j ∈ N4 ∩N({y, z})
z Âqj x for l ∈ N4 ∩N({x, z}).
Note that %pj |{x, y} =%qj |{x, y} for all j ∈ N({x, y}). Since {i} is an (x Â z)-
decisive coalition from Lemma 3.8, we see that x Âq z. By Axiom (WPO), we also
have z Âq y. Then x Âq y by the transitivity. Applying Axiom (IIA) we conclude
that x Âp y, meaning that i is a dictator. ¤
4. Special Case
Ando, Ohara and Yamamoto [1] consider a social preference ordering in a situation
of mutual evaluation. Each individual evaluates all individuals in the society but
oneself. Namely, the set of alternatives coincides with the set of individuals in the
society, X = N , and individual i’s preference domain Xi is given by Xi = N \ {i}.
They show an impossibility theorem in this situation. One of the crucial roles in
their argument is played by the “cyclic profile” c which is the profile defined by
2 ≺c1 3 ≺c1 · · · ≺c1 n
i+ 1 ≺ci i+ 2 ≺ci · · · ≺ci n− 1 ≺ci n ≺ci 1 ≺ci · · · ≺ci i− 1 for i = 2, · · · , n− 1
1 ≺cn 2 ≺cn · · · ≺cn n− 1.
It is readily seen that assuming Axiom (WPO) would lead to a social preference %c
such that
1 ≺c 2 ≺c · · · ≺c n− 1 ≺c n ≺c 1
which is not a weak ordering. Hence the social welfare function is impossible. They
show that relaxing Axiom (WPO) in several ways would not lead to a positive result
under Axioms (UDP) and (IIA). To exclude the controversial cyclic profile add an
individual who is entitled to evaluate all the individuals in the society. Then from
Theorem 3.1 we see that the social welfare function is dictatorial and the additional
individual is a dictator.
5. Concluding Remarks
We consider a society where each individual’s preference domain is restricted to
a subset of the whole set of alternatives. We have shown the impossibility theorem
that a social welfare function is always dictatorial whenever at least one individual
has an unrestricted preference domain.
One of possible future research themes would be strategy-proofness (see [6, 13]). A
natural question to answer would be “if a nonmanipulable voting is always dictatorial
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when individuals have restricted preference domain?” such as mutual evaluation
situation.
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